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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-
2a-3(j) of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Appellant and Defendant Prime Commercial ("Prime") waived its 
right to appeal this matter by stipulating to judgment resolving all claims between the parties 
(R. 924-25; 926-28). 
A judgment given pursuant to a stipulation of the parties is presumed to be correct 
in the absence of a showing to the contrary. Payton v. Magleby. 516 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah 
1973). 
2. Whether the trial court correctly determined, in granting summary judgment 
to Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), that Defendant Prime Commercial ("Prime") was 
not entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of an interest in a development 
partnership owned by a limited liability company controlled by Mitchell, where such 
development was expressly excluded from the terms of Mitchell's Agreement with Prime 
pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the contract (R. 235-36, 907-09; 955 at pp. 3-16). 
"Determining whether a contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question of law, 
which [is] review[ed] for correctness. If a contract is unambiguous, a trial court may 
interpret the contract as a matter of law, and [the appellate court] review['s] the court's 
F:\WORD\AN\MITCH\APPEALBF.WPD 1 
interpretation for correctness." Interwest Const, v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 
1996) (citations omitted). 
3. Whether the trial court correctly determined that Paragraph 18 of the 
Agreement between Mitchell and Prime was unenforceable as a matter of law (R. 237-40, 
909-11, 955 at pp. 3-16). 
A trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous contract is reviewed for correctness. 
Interwest, 923 P.2d at 1358. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional provisions are set forth in the 
addendum where not set forth fully in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from the trial court's order granting Mitchell's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against Prime on its counterclaim against Mitchell for breach of 
contract. (R. 929-37). After the trial court ruled at the hearing on Mitchell's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed Prime's counterclaim, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation on May 29,1998 wherein Prime stipulated to judgment against it on all claims 
(R. 1-11; 924-25). Prime did not reserve any right to appeal the trial court's entry of partial 
summary judgment on Prime's Counterclaim in the Stipulation signed by Prime (R. 924-25). 
Thereafter, the trial court entered its Order and Judgment on June 3, 1998 which was 
approved as to form by Prime's counsel (R. 926-27). The Order and Judgment likewise did 
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not reserve any right to appeal from the stipulated judgment (R. 926-27). Two days later, 
the trial court entered its Order on Summary Judgment, to which order Prime did not object. 
After entry of the final Order and Judgment, Prime then filed its Notice of Appeal seeking 
to appeal the trial court's dismissal of Prime's Counterclaim (R. 943-45). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 1, 1994, Appellee Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell") and Appellant Prime 
Commercial, Inc. ("Prime") entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement 
("Agreement") whereby Mitchell agreed to perform services as a real estate agent for Prime 
as an independent contractor (R. 5-11; Add. Exh. A). Pursuant to the express terms of the 
Agreement, Mitchell's duties with respect to Prime were specifically limited to the 
following: "to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representation agreements or 
management contract [sic] of property." (R. 6) In fact, the Agreement expressly stated that 
"Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with Broker" except for those 
listed above." (R. 6; Add. Exh. A). 
Mitchell's employment with Prime was terminated on or about August 31,1994 (R. 
933). At the time Mitchell ceased working for Prime, Prime owed Mitchell the sum of 
$20,544.69 in earned but unpaid commissions (R. 2, 924). When Prime failed and refused 
to pay the commissions owing to Mitchell, Mitchell filed his Complaint. 
Meanwhile, during the same time period in which Mitchell was working as an 
independent contractor for Prime, Mitchell became a member of Red Point Equities, L.L.C. 
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("Red Point"), which was organized for the purpose of engaging in real estate development, 
not sales or marketing (R. 931). In the course of Red Point's business dealings, Red Point's 
interest in a joint venture to develop certain real property was purchased by one Leonard 
litigation between Fong and Red Point (R. 298-99). At the time of Fong's purchase of the 
partnership interest, the joint venture had not entered into any listing agreement with Prime 
for the listing or sale of any of the finished units because no development or construction 
hadcoiiimciin'J (U 4.11- O). 
After Mitchell commenced this action by filing his Complaint, Prime filed a 
Counterclaim alleging that Prime was entitled to (i) a portion of the commissions Mitchell 
earned as an agent for Proactive Properties ("Proactive"), Mitchell's new broker; as well as 
(R. 36). Prime claimed it was entitled to a portion of the commissions Mitchell earned as 
an agent with Proactive pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Agreement, which states: 
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any 
information or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker. 
(R. 36). Prime interpreted this language to mean that Prime was entitled to a portion of any 
commissions Mitchell earned after termination of his employment with Prime since Mitchell 
necessarily learned everything he knew about the real estate industry through his 
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employment with Prime (R. 36, 837). Further, Prime claimed entitlement to commissions 
earned by Mitchell in transactions with any former Prime clients. (R. 36, 837). 
With respect to the Fong partnership payment to Red Point, Prime claimed that it was 
entitled to a portion of the Fong partnership payment because Mitchell agreed, by virtue of 
the employment Agreement, to "do 'all employment in connection with the real estate 
business' through Prime" (R. 829). Thus, according to Prime, Mitchell's participation in a 
real estate development company was allegedly on behalf of Prime, despite the express 
language of Paragraph 4 of the employment Agreement to the contrary (R. 829). 
During the course of the proceedings before the trial court, Mitchell filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on both claims contained in Prime's Counterclaim asserting 
that (i) under the express terms of the Agreement, Prime was not entitled to a portion of the 
Fong payment; and (ii) as a matter of law, Paragraph 18 of the Agreement constitutes an 
unenforceable covenant not to compete (R. 228-41). Prime opposed Mitchell's motion 
alleging that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether development 
activities were covered by the Agreement and whether Mitchell used information gained 
through employment with Prime after termination of his employment (R. 822-33). 
After a hearing on the matter, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, 
4. Because the Agreement has no facial ambiguity and does not 
cover development activities, and because there was no amendment to the 
Agreement providing otherwise, Prime Commercial is not entitled to 
participate in any consideration to Red Point (even if construed to be for the 
benefit of Mitchell) for profits or an interest in a development joint venture 
with Fong. 
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5. Because the Agreement, specifically Paragraph 18, contains no 
facial ambiguity, and because the use of any information or materials gained 
by Mitchell from Prime Commercial would prohibit any competition by 
Mitchell, such restriction is unenforceable as a matter of law. 
6. Because Paragraph 18 is not ambiguous and because the 
contract is an integrated contract, the Defendant is not entitled to rely upon 
parol evidence, including but not limited to alleged industry standards of 
additional terms imposed upon agents after their termination with a brokers, 
[sic] 
7. There is no reference in Paragraph 18 to either a restriction in 
time or geographic area for the use of such information and Paragraph 18 is, 
therefore, unenforceable. 
• >35-36; Add. Exh. 3), - Vfter entry of the final Order and Judgment and the Ordei of 
bumir. •• * J d 1.1,1 ii en ( that Punic filed litis appe.il. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Three issues are presented in this brief: (i) whether Prime waived its right to appeal 
by entering into the Stipulation for entry of a final judgmnent (ii) whether the trial court 
proceeds of the Fong settlement; and (iii) whether the trial court correctly ruled that 
Paragraph 18 of the Agreement constitutes an unenforceable covenant not to compete. On 
the first issue presented, Utah law is clear with respect to waivers of appellate review. 
Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant appeal and there is no need for 
further consideration of the remaining issues on appeal. 
With respect to the second issue, the trial court correctly determined that the activities 
vo\ erect by the Agreement did not iiiiilude re;il eslale development pursuant to Paragrapl i 4 
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of the Agreement. Giving effect to all parts of the Agreement as a whole, Prime's 
interpretation of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement — to which Prime bases its entitlement to 
payment from the Fong proceeds — is unreasonable and untenable. Prime's position is 
insufficient to create a question of fact with respect to the meaning of the language contained 
in Paragraphs 4 and 11. The trial court correctly determined that the Agreement was 
unambiguous and that as a matter of law, Prime was not entitled to a portion of the proceeds 
of the Fong settlement since real estate development was not covered by the Agreement. 
Concerning the third issue on appeal, the trial court correctly determined that 
Paragraph 18 of the Agreement constitutes an unenforceable covenant not to compete for 
a number of reasons. The plain and unambiguous language of Paragraph 18 restricted 
Mitchell from engaging in a common calling once he ceased working with Prime 
Commercial. Prime failed to present evidence before the trial court to suggest that 
Paragraph 18 was necessary to protect the business of Prime. Paragraph 18 fails to contain 
reasonable restrictions as to time or geographical scope. Furthermore, enforcement as 
sought by Prime would violate Utah law. The plain and unambiguous language of 
Paragraph 18 constitutes an unenforceable covenant not to compete, as the trial court 
correctly found. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PRIME WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT BY ENTERING INTO A 
STIPULATION FOR JUDGMENT WITHOUT 
EXPRESSLY RESERVING ANY RIGHT TO APPEAL. 
After the Court's ruling on Summary Judgment but prior to entry of the trial court's 
Order of Summary Judgment (R. 929-37), Prime entered into a Stipulation agreeing that 
Judgment be entered agaiiisl Prune mid in kivot o) Mildirll mi the amount HI" $52,828.38 
plus interest and attorney's fees (R. 924-25). That Stipulation was signed by counsel for 
Prime (R. 925). Nowhere in the Stipulation did Prime reserve the right to appeal either the 
summary judgment previously rendered by the trial court or the final Order and Judgment 
which was entered by the trial court upon consideration of the Stipulation itsei \ loreover, 
counsel for Pri me signed the final Order and Judgment e\ io* .»; i: m- .IPPM»X r. j - iorrn 
without reserving whatsoever any right to appeal. (R. 926-27). In its own brief, Prime 
conceded that it stipulated to a final judgment "resolving all claims." (Brief of Appellant at 
2). By failing to expressly reserve any right to appeal, Prime waived its right to appeal the 
issues raised in. its Brief of Appellant when it eiitei ed into the Stipulat ipproved the 
Order and Judgment. 
Utah law is clear. "The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that appeal may 
be taken from a final judgment, but they do not contemplate appeal from a consent decree." 
Daltonv.Herold.9J4 F ?d H<* <>M)|H|:ii' l<>07), (i R.App.P ^a»flC)%l Moreover, "[a] 
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judgment by consent or stipulation is generally construed as an agreement between the 
parties under which the terms of the judgment are not subject to review on appeal." Estate 
of Anderson. 671 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah 1983) (citing Snvder v. Tompkins. 20 Wash.App. 
167, 579 P.2d 994 (1978); Pacific National Bank of Washington v. Mount. 97 Idaho 887, 
556 P.2d 70 (1976); Washington Asphalt Co. V. Harold Kaeser Co.. 51 Wash.2d 89, 316 
P.2d 126 (1957)). 
In the instant case, the final Order and Judgment was entered based upon the 
Stipulation between the parties (R. 926-27). Where Prime failed to reserve the right to 
appeal any portion of the Order and Judgment, the judgment is presumed correct, and Prime 
has waived its right to appeal. Thus, this Court should summarily affirm the trial court's 
Order and Judgment without reference to any of the claims raised in Prime's appeal. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
PRIME WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE 
PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF MITCHELL'S 
INTEREST IN A DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHD?. 
In Prime's Counterclaim, Prime sought to obtain a commission from Mitchell's sale 
of his ownership interest in a real estate development joint venture contrary to the plain and 
unambiguous language of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement between Prime and Mitchell. The 
trial court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the plain and unambiguous terms of the 
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Agreement precluded recovery by Prime. Accordingly, the trial court's order of partial 
summary judgment should be upheld. 
A. The trial court correctly gave effect to all of the parts of the Agreement in 
determining whether the Agreement was ambiguous. 
It is a basic rule of contract interpretation that ff[e]ach contract provision is to be 
considered in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none." Plateau Min. Co. V. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 
725 (Utah 1990); Utah Vallev Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060,1061-61 (Utah 1981); Sears 
v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105,1107-08 (Utah 1982). While this Court, in recent years, has 
indicated that a trial court should "consider the writing in light of the surrounding 
circumstances," Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995), this 
Court has also made clear that "a contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just 
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does." R& 
R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936, P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). "To 
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable. Id.: 
Plateau Min. Co.. 802 P.2d at 725. 
Prime's obvious strategy all along has been to create an ambiguity within the contract 
by offering an interpretation of the contract and repeatedly suggesting that such 
interpretation is reasonable — as if simply calling the interpretation reasonable over and 
over again makes it so. However, upon examination, Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 
11 runs afoul of Utah Law, is not consistent with the remainder of the Agreement, and 
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ignores fundamental legal principles. Therefore, Prime's interpretation is untenable, is 
unreasonable, and fails to create an ambiguity in the document. Since the Agreement is not 
ambiguous, the trial court was correct in interpreting it as a matter of law. 
B. Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement is inconsistent with the 
purpose and plain language of the remainder of the Agreement, and therefore, 
is untenable and unreasonable. 
Prime contends that since Mitchell was required, pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement, to take "all employment in connection with the real estate business" in Prime's 
name, and since real estate development is "employment in connection with the real estate 
business" (at least according to Prime and their "expert"), Prime was entitled to share in the 
funds Mitchell received for the sale of Red Point's interest in the Fong joint venture (Brief 
of Appellant at 13). Not only is this position contrary to the plain language of the 
Agreement, it is contrary to the purpose of the Agreement and Utah law. 
1. Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 11 is contrary to the plain 
language of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement. 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states: 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and use 
Agent's best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with 
Broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and otherwise 
promote the business of serving the public in real estate transactions to the end 
that each of the parties to this Agreement may derive the greatest profit 
possible, provided that nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require 
Agent to handle or solicit particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or 
require that Agent do so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in 
association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, 
leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, 
for the parties' mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the 
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ethical and professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this 
Agreement. 
(R. 6; Add. Exh. 4; emphasis added). 
Real estate development, which consists of building or constructing improvements 
upon real property clearly is not included with Paragraph 4. The only activities 
contemplated within the scope of the Agreement were "to solicit and obtain listings and 
sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property." (R. 6; Add. 
Exh. 4). Paragraph 4 of the Agreement precluded Mitchell from engaging in any real estate 
development with Prime Commercial. Conversely, Prime Commercial could have no 
proprietary interest in the joint venture and was limited to taking a listing agreement between 
the joint venture and Prime Commercial allowing Prime Commercial to engage in activities 
related to "sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property." 
(R. 6; Add. Exh. 4). There was no such listing agreement. Any alleged oral statements to 
the contrary clearly conflict with the express language of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement. The 
trial court correctly found that Prime Commercial had no interest in the Fong-Red Point joint 
venture nor any of the buy-out proceeds received by Red Point. 
Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 11 renders Paragraph 4 entirely meaningless. If, 
as Prime suggests, Mitchell was required to engage in real estate development (building or 
constructing) in the name of Prime pursuant to Paragraph 11 even though real estate 
development is not one of the activities enumerated in Paragraph 4, the limiting language 
expressly stated in Paragraph 4 has no effect. 
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Moreover, there are a myriad of other activities which constitute "employment in 
connection with real estate" which obviously run contrary to the plain language of this real 
estate broker-agent agreement but nonetheless would require Mitchell to pay Prime if he 
engaged in those activities. For instance, the following types of employment are a limited 
list of endeavors connected to real estate: landscape maintenance, title insurance, mortgage 
originations, property insurance, roofing, paving, painting, heating and air conditioning, and 
appraising. Taking Prime's position to the logical extreme, in the event Mitchell decided 
to engage in any of the aforementioned activities, he would be obligated under Paragraph 
11 of the broker-agent agreement to take such business in the name of Prime Commercial, 
notwithstanding the express language of Paragraph 4. This example demonstrates the 
absurdity of Prime's position. Clearly, this broker-agent agreement contemplated only the 
activities listed in Paragraph 4. The Agreement did not relate to real estate development. 
Prime's contentions to the contrary are unreasonable, untenable, and insufficient to create 
an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. 
2. Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 11 is contrary to the purpose 
of the Agreement as a whole. 
Not only is Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 11 contrary to the express language 
of Paragraph 4, it is also contrary to the purpose of the Agreement as a whole. The recitals 
at the beginning of the Agreement clearly set forth the nature of the relationship between the 
parties. Those recitals state: 
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WHEREAS, Broker is qualified to and does engage in business as a licensed 
general real estate broker in the State of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Agent is now engaged in business as a licensed real estate agent; 
and 
WHEREAS, the parties consider it to be to their mutual advantage to form the 
association hereinafter agreed to. 
(R. 5; Add. Exh. 4). The activities contemplated by these recitals are those activities 
performed by licensed real estate brokers and agents. Those activities are specifically listed 
throughout the Agreement itself. 
For instance, pursuant to Paragraph 1, Prime was to make current real estate listings 
available to Mitchell and to supply Mitchell with prospective listings in Prime's discretion. 
In Paragraph 2, Prime agreed to furnish advice, information and cooperation and Mitchell 
assumed and retained discretion for "methods, techniques and procedures used in soliciting 
and obtaining listings and sales, leases, or representation agreements." (R. 6; Add. Exh.4). 
As previously mentioned, Mitchell agreed in Paragraph 4 to: "use Agent's best efforts 
to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, to solicit additional listings and 
customers for Broker." In Paragraph 5, both Prime and Mitchell agreed "to conform to and 
abide by all laws, rules and regulations, and codes of ethics that are binging upon or 
applicable to real estate brokers or agents." (R. 6; Add. Exh.4). 
None of these paragraphs and no other provisions of the Agreement address real 
estate development as an activity covered by the Agreement. In fact, even Paragraph 11, 
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upon which Prime bases its entire argument, refers to listings of property. This Agreement, 
is specifically limited to those activities connected with procuring listings for the Broker, 
selling, leasing, representing clients, or managing property. Prime simply cannot rely upon 
the phrase contained in Paragraph 11 in isolation. That phrase must be read in relation to 
the rest of Paragraph 11 as well as the rest of the Agreement. Real estate development was 
not contemplated within the language of the Agreement. Prime CommerciaPs interpretation 
of Paragraph 11 is not reasonable or tenable., As such, the trial court correctly determined 
that real estate development was not included in the scope of the Agreement and Prime was 
therefore not entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the Fong settlement (R. 935). 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE AGREEMENT 
CONSTITUTED AN UNENFORCEABLE COVENANT 
NOT TO COMPETE. 
Mitchell asserted in his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the trial court 
agreed, that Paragraph 18 of the Agreement was not ambiguous and constituted an 
unenforceable covenant not to compete because it is not reasonable in its restrictions as to 
time and geographic area. (R. 935). Paragraph 18 states: 
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any 
information or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker. 
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(R. 7; Add. Exh.4). Referring to the language of this paragraph, Prime Commercial claimed 
it was entitled to a percentage of commissions Mitchell earned after his termination with 
Prime Commercial and while he was an agent for another broker, Proactive. Prime 
Commercial reasoned that since Paragraph 18 prohibited Mitchell from "using any 
information or materials obtained from Prime" (R. 830), any contact Mitchell had with 
former Prime Commercial clients required him to compensate Prime Commercial. 
A. Paragraph 18 constitutes a covenant not to compete. 
A strict reading of Paragraph 18 would prevent Mitchell from earning a living in the 
manner of his choosing. Prime Commercial claimed that everything Mitchell knew about 
the real estate industry in general, Mitchell learned from Prime Commercial (R. 837). 
Obviously, if this were true, Mitchell would have violated Paragraph 18 if he engaged in any 
real estate marketing or sales after his termination with Prime Commercial. 
In order to inject any plausibility into Prime Commercial9s position, Prime 
Commercial changed its strategy and narrowed its argument at the summary judgment stage 
to claim that Mitchell violated Paragraph 18 by engaging in business with former or 
potential clients of Prime Commercial after his termination (R. 830). Even with this change 
in position, Paragraph 18 nonetheless constitutes a covenant not to compete, since it places 
— at a minimum — monetary restrictions on Mitchell's ability to engage in the real estate 
profession. 
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In Prime's Brief of Appellant, Prime cites to Robbins v. Finlay for the proposition 
that "an employee may be prevented from using customer leads gained from a former 
employer, even in situations where a covenant not to compete would be unenforceable." 
(Brief of Appellant at 20). Prime suggests that Paragraph 18 merely restricts Mitchell from 
using client leads he received from Prime once he leaves Prime, and thus is not a covenant 
not to compete. Prime next cites to the Alaskan case of Metcalfe Investments v. Garrison, 
919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996) as further support for its proposition. However, one glaring 
difference sets the instant case apart from both Robbins and Metcalfe. 
Robbins involved a contractual covenant which related to a list of prospects for and 
users of hearing aids. 645 P.2d at 624, n.l. The contract identified the list of prospects as 
a trade secret, specifically prohibited the salesman from making a copy of the list, required 
the salesman to use it only in the course of the company's business and to return the list 
upon termination of his employment. The contract further prohibited the salesman from 
using the list to the detriment of the company. Id.. 
Similarly, in Metcalfe, the agent had specifically agreed not to use the broker's client 
list after leaving her employment and she further agreed "not to participate in sales to 
potential buyers who had first made contact" with the broker. 919 P.2d at 1361. In both 
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Robbins and Metcalfe, the covenants were narrowly tailored to restrict only the use of client 
lists.1 
This is not so in the present case. Paragraph 18 was not narrowly tailored to restrict 
the use of client or prospective client lists. Rather, Paragraph 18 clearly prohibited the use 
of "any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker." There 
is no language restricting "any information or materials" to only client lists. The word "any" 
is all inclusive and encompasses everything Mitchell could have possibly learned or acquired 
from Prime including such items as the Utah standard form real estate purchase contract, the 
Multiple Listings Service real estate listing publications, or copies of newspaper 
advertisements of property for sale — basic tools of the trade. The fact that Paragraph 18 
restricts Mitchell from using "any information or materials" rather that only restricting him 
from using prospective client lists, underscores that this paragraph is a covenant not to 
compete rather than merely a restriction on the use of proprietary information. Thus, the 
question becomes whether the covenant not to compete contained within Paragraph 18 is 
enforceable. 
B. The covenant not to compete contained within Paragraph 18 of the Agreement 
is unenforceable. 
*Notably, the Metcalfe Court emphasized that by its decision it was not holding 
"that all restraints on contacting former customers will be found to be reasonable." Id at 
1362, n. 5. The Court identified several circumstances in which such a clause would not 
be reasonable; for instance, where the former employee did not have access to 
confidential information. Id. The case of Metcalfe is hardly persuasive authority for 
modifying case law that has served Utah courts well for more than forty years. 
F:\WORD\AN\MTCCH\APPEALBF.WPD 18 
Utah courts have long recognized that covenants not to compete are "necessary for 
the protection of the goodwill of the business when it is shown that although the employee 
learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away customers from his former employer, if he 
were permitted to compete nearby." Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 P,2d 86, (Utah 
1992); (quoting System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983); Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608,617,237 P.2d 823, 827-28 (1951)). However, in order 
to be enforceable, Utah courts have uniformly required that they be "carefully drawn to 
protect only the legitimate interests of the employer." Robbins v. Finlay. 645 P.2d 623,627 
(Utah 1982). 
"The reasonableness of a covenant depends upon several factors, including its 
geographical extent: the duration of the limitation: the nature of the employee's duties; and 
the nature of the interest which the employer seeks to protect such as trade secrets, the 
goodwill of his business, or an extraordinary investment in the training or education of the 
employee." Robbins 645 P.2d at 627 (emphasis added); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 
P.2d 86, n. 1 (Utah 1992) (the restriction must be reasonable in time and geographic area); 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608, 619, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (Utah 1951). In the 
instant case, Paragraph 18 fails to contain several of the above listed characteristics; most 
notably, there are no reasonable restrictions as to time and geographical scope. Accordingly, 
Paragraph 18 constitutes an unreasonable and unenforceable covenant not to compete. 
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Once again, Prime in its brief has attempted to create an ambiguity within the 
Agreement where none existed. Prime contends that as long as it's position — that "any 
information or materials" refers to customer lists — is tenable, the contract term was 
ambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate. (Brief of Appellant at 23-25). This 
position, however, is disingenuous and contrary to Prime's position on summary judgment. 
Before the trial court, Prime argued that attempts "to limit the terms of paragraph 18 to only 
"Prime listings," are not persuasive as paragraph 18 specifically precludes Mitchell from 
using 'information or materials gained for or from the files and business' of Prime." (R. 
830). Similarly, the affidavit of William K. Martin, submitted by Prime, states: 
8. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 18 of his contract with 
Prime and the standard in the commercial real estate industry, Mitchell should 
have provided a portion of his commissions earned for one year after he left 
Prime to Prime especially where Mitchell engaged in real estate transactions 
with individuals or entities who were customers of Prime. 
(R. 878) (emphasis added). Notably, Prime's "expert" did not attest that Mitchell should 
have provided only a portion of commissions earned from former or current Prime clients. 
Prime's position on summary judgment was that paragraph 18 entitled Prime to recover on 
any of Mitchell's commissions for up to one year after Mitchell left Prime, meaning that 
paragraph 18 referred to more than merely client lists. 
In the instant case, there was no genuine issue of material fact before the trial court 
as to the meaning of "any information and materials" as contained in Paragraph 18 of the 
Agreement. The trial court correctly determined that Paragraph 18 was not ambiguous and 
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not enforceable. While it is true that "the choice of contract interpretations which avoid 
invalidating an agreement is favored under Utah law," Coulter & Smith. Ltd. V. Russell 966 
P.2d 852,857-58, this case represents a "clear[] situation" where the contract provision must 
be invalidated, especially in light of the well settled rule that courts "will not rewrite a 
contract to alleviate a contracting party's mistake, but will construe it according to its terms 
as written." Howe v. Professional Manivest Inc.. 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah App. 1992); 
Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah App. 1990). To the extent that on appeal Prime 
now seeks to limit the language of Paragraph 18 to be "prospective client lists" instead of 
"any information or materials," such was a mistake that Prime made in drafting the contract. 
This court should not take upon itself to rewrite the terms of the contract now that a dispute 
among the contracting parties has arisen, especially where the trial court correctly 
determined the language to be clear and unambiguous. 
C. This appellate court should not inject into the Agreement additional contract 
terms as to time and geographical limitations of paragraph 18. 
Prime contends that the trial court could have easily read geographical and time 
limitations into Paragraph 18 thereby rendering that covenant enforceable. This argument 
fails, however, for several reasons. First, even if reasonable geographical and time 
limitations were read into Paragraph 18, that paragraph would still constitute an 
unenforceable covenant not to compete since the broad language of the paragraph as written 
restricts Mitchell from using any tools of the trade he learned while working with Prime. 
Before the trial court, Prime failed to present evidence to show that Paragraph 18, as written, 
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was "necessary to protect the goodwill of the business." System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669P.2dat421 (Utah 1983). 
Not only would the trial court have had to insert additional terms as to time and 
geographical location, the trial court would have had to rewrite the paragraph to restrict 
Mitchell from using specific items such as prospective client lists in order to tailor the 
contract language to protect any legitimate business interest. Again, trial courts are 
discouraged from rewriting contract terms to alleviate a contracting party's mistake. Howe 
829 P.2d at 164. Merely inserting geographical and time limitations into Paragraph 18 
would not save the covenant not to compete. The requirement contained in Paragraph 18 
prohibiting Mitchell from using "any information or materials" simply is not necessary to 
protect the business of Prime. 
Second, Prime completely failed to present the trial court with any evidence to 
consider in determining a reasonable geographical limitation to insert into Paragraph 18. 
While Prime did argue that a time limitation of one year would be reasonable, Prime utterly 
neglected the issue of a reasonable geographical limitation for insertion. Thus the trial court 
was left with no evidence from which to base any determination regarding geography. In 
an obvious and belated attempt to remedy Prime's prior neglect on this issue, Prime claims 
on appeal that such geographical evidence would not be necessary, based upon the case, 
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1983), (Brief of Appellant at 27). 
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Yet the facts of System Concepts were so unique as to render it completely distinguishable 
from the case at hand. 
System Concepts involved a covenant not to compete between a cable television 
equipment manufacturer and its former national sales director. Id At 424. Importantly, 
there was no question that the services rendered by the former national sales director were 
"special, unique or extraordinary." Id At 426. The record reflected that "defendant's 
position as national sales manager entailed responsibilities which were special and unique 
in comparison to other employees with sales-related positions. In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court in rendering its opinion noted the distinguishable circumstances, stating: 
The business being protected in this case (cable television) is not one which 
is sought locally by a localized clientele. Due to the recent inception of the 
cable television industry, the entire market for SCI's products is limited to 
approximately 2,500 potential customers, all of which are located within the 
United States. In light of the industry's inherent limitations and the nature of 
defendant's particular employment, it was not unreasonable for SCI to omit 
from the covenant a specific and explicit spacial restriction. The coven ant is 
impliedly limited to the area in which SCI has been and is seeking its market. 
Furthermore, the breadth of the covenant is sufficiently limited by specific 
activity restrictions, which, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, 
have greater utility and propriety than spacial restrictions. 
Id At 427. 
Clearly, the instant case is not even remotely similar to the facts of System Concepts. 
There was no evidence presented to the trial court to show that Mitchell's duties with respect 
to Prime were "special, unique or extraordinary." Mitchell was a real estate agent as were 
many others working with Prime. Likewise, there was no evidence presented to the trial 
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court to suggest that the real estate industry in which Prime and Mitchell were engaged was 
relatively new, specialized, unique or inherently limited. In short, there was no evidence to 
suggest that "the breadth of [Paragraph 18] is sufficiently limited by specific activity 
restrictions, which . . . have greater utility and propriety than spacial restrictions." 
Accordingly, there is no basis whatsoever for justifying any departure from Utah's long 
standing precedence that a covenant not to compete must "be reasonable in its restrictions 
as to time and area." Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 273 P.2d 823, 828 (Utah 1951) 
(emphasis added); Kasco Services Corp. V. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 97, n.l (Utah 1992); 
Robbinsv.Finlay. 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982).2 The trial court correctly applied the law 
in determining that Paragraph 18 was unenforceable since it lacked reasonable restrains as 
to time and geographic location (R. 936). 
D. The enforcement of Paragraph 18 as sought by Prime would violate Utah law. 
Prime argued before the trial court that Prime was entitled to a portion of Mitchell's 
commissions earned with his new broker for a period of up to one year after he left Prime 
for violating Paragraph 18 of the Agreement. (R. 830-32; 878; 955 at p. 22). However, 
enforcement of Paragraph 18 as suggested by Prime runs afoul of Utah law (R. 955 at p. 12-
13). Section 61-2-10(3) of the Utah Code provides that "No sales agent or associate broker 
2See also Abramson v. Blackman. 166 N.E.2d 729, 730 (Mass. 1960) (striking 
covenant not to use information for indefinite period); Cohen Realty. Inc. v. Marinick. 
817 P.2d 747, 749 (OklaApp. 1991) (refusing to enforce covenant with no geographical 
limit); and Pancake Realty Co. V. Harber. 73 S.E.2d 438,443 (W.Va. 1952) (striking 
covenant without territorial limits). 
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may affiliate with more than one principal broker at the same time." In fact, an agent may 
be subject to a civil penalty if he is found guilty of "representing or attempting to represent 
a broker other than the principal broker with whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales 
agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of sales agent with other than a 
licensed principal broker." U.C.A. § 61-2-11 (1997). 
If Mitchell were forced to share with Prime for one year the commissions he earned 
while working and licensed with Proactive, he essentially would be acting on behalf of 
Prime in a "relationship similar to that of sales agent" in violation of Section 61-2-11. 
"It is the generally accepted doctrine of this country that every contract in violation 
of law is void. It is equally true that our courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of 
nor permit a recovery of compensation under, contracts made and entered into in violation 
of the law prohibiting them or declaring them to be unlawful." Baker v. Latses. 206 P. 553, 
555 (Utah 1922); Haddock v. Salt Lake City. 23 Utah, 527,65 P. 491 (Utah 1901).3 Prime's 
interpretation of Paragraph 18 is in violation of Utah statutory law and therefore is 
unenforceable. Furthermore, the fact that Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 18 renders the 
contract clause illegal also supports the conclusion that Prime's interpretation of Paragraph 
18 is not reasonable or tenable. Therefore, there is no basis for looking beyond the plain 
language of Paragraph 18. As written, Paragraph 18 of the Agreement plainly and 
3See also 17A AMJUR2D Contracts § 247: "As a general rule, an agreement which 
violates a provision of the federal or a state constitution, or of a constitutional statue, or 
which cannot be performed without violating such a provision, is illegal and void." 
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unambiguously constitutes an unenforceable covenant not to compete. The trial court was 
correct in so finding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff and Appellee Brent Mitchell respectfully requests 
that this Court dismiss Prime's appeal based upon the consent judgment, or alternatively, to 
uphold the trial court's Order on Summary Judgment. Mitchell further requests that this 
Court award Mitchell its costs incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to Rule 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this _ ^ day of February, 1999 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Brent 
Mitchell 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following this day of 
February, 1999: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
Stephen P. Horvat 
ANDERSON & KAREENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, U(Sh 84 ft 
.£*?77i / ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Stipulation (R. 924-25) 
2. Order and Judgment (R. 926-28) 
3. Order of Summary Judgment (R. 929-37) 
4. Agreement (R. 5-11) 
5. Complaint (R. 1-11) 
6. Answer and Counterclaim (R. 32-37) 
7. Affidavit of Brent Mitchell (R. 297-306) 
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Tabl 
DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)263-3344 
Fax: (801)263-1010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a Corp-
oration, and SALT LAKE BOARD OF 
REALTORS, A Corporation, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
CIVIL NO. 950906465 CV 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
PLAINTIFF BRENT D. MITCHELL, by and through his attorney, Dennis K. Poole, 
and Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc, by and through its attorney, Nathan B. Wilcox, 
do hereby stipulate, agree and move as follows: 
1. The parties hereto agree and stipulate that Judgment be entered against 
Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. for $52,828.38, being the sum of the following: 
(i) $20,544.69 representing commissions payable to Plaintiff Brent 
Mitchell and earned under a Broker Agent Agreement dated 
January 1, 1994, for the following transactions: 
Stewart - Farnsworth 
Stewart - Brenkenridge 
Fong - Kessimakis 
Fong - Kessimakis 
Reynolds - Triple K 
8/16/94 
9/13/94 
11/16/94 
11/16/94 
5/8/95 
$ 111.06 
$ 2,826.25 
$ 3,219.38 
$ 2,856.75 
$11,531.25 
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(ii) $6,783.69 representing interest at 10% per annum upon the 
commissions due above from the date specified through June 1, 
1998, together with 
(iii) in accordance with the terms of the Broker Agent Agreement, 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $25,500.00. 
2. The parties hereto stipulate and agree that the Judgment against 
Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. shall provide for augmentation for attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in collection. 
3. The parties hereto agree and stipulate that interest on the Judgment shall 
accrue at the legal post-judgment interest rate until paid. 
4. The parties hereto hereby move that this Court vacate the trial date 
currently scheduled for June 2, 1998, and enter Judgment against Defendant Prime 
Commercial, Inc. consistent with the terms herein contained. 
DATED this 2Sj day of May<rT9~9S*s 
- D b ^ T s T ^ L E ^ 7 ^ 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DATED this ffi^ day of May, 1998. 
"HAN B/-WILC0X / 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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m 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)263-3344 
Fax: (801)263-1010 
a 
FILED DISTRICT COU^T 
Third Judicial Distric. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
£££3334 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a Corp-
oration, and SALT LAKE BOARD OF 
REALTORS, A Corporation, 
Defendants. 
<#-5-1« 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 950906465 CV 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
This Court, having considered the Stipulation of Plaintiff Brent Mitchell and 
Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc., and for good cause appearing, does 
HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
1. The trial date of Tuesday, June 2, 1998 is hereby vacated. 
2. Judgment against Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. and in favor of the 
Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell is hereby entered in the amount of $52,828.38 (which 
A ft ft 0 9 P 
judgment includes attorneys' fees and costs in accordance with the terms of the 
parties' stipulation). 
3. This Judgment shall be augmented by affidavit to include Plaintiff's costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in collecting the Judgment. 
4. This Judgment shall continue to accrue at the legal post-judgment interest 
rate of 7.46 % per annum until paid. 
DATED this 8 day of June, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to Form: 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following this / day of 
^M«ry71998: 
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City,v#taVK84101 
-At 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER GODFREY (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Telecopier: (801) 263-1010 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a : Civil No. 950906465 CV 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE : 
BOARD OF REALTORS, a : 
Corporation, : JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Defendants. : 
On the 8th day of May, 1998, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. The Plaintiff appeared by 
and through his attorney, Dennis K. Poole, and the Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. 
appeared by and through its attorney, Nathan Wilcox. The Court having considered 
the affidavits and memoranda in support of and in opposition to such Motion for Partial 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
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Summary Judgment and having determined that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact which are set forth as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an individual, and the Defendant 
Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime Commercial"), a corporation, entered into an 
agreement dated January 1, 1994, designated by the parties as a broker-agent 
agreement (the "Agreement"), whereby Mitchell agreed to act as an independent 
licensed real estate agent for Prime Commercial, as broker. 
2. Paragraph 7 of the Agreement states: 
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to 
Paragraph 6 of this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after 
collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the 
services may have been performed. Any suit for the collection of 
commissions from clients shall be maintained only in the name of Broker. 
Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or payment from Broker upon 
future commissions or commissions earned but uncollected. Agent's only 
remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions paid by the party 
or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to 
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note. 
3. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement states: 
In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of 
property, and all employment in connection with the real estate business 
shall be taken in the name of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker 
within twenty four (24) hours after receipt of any such listing by Agent. 
In consideration for the commission payable to Agent pursuant to the 
terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby contribute all 
right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to 
Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents 
associated with Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, 
however, that Agent shall have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of 
this Agreement with respect to listings procured by Agent prior to 
termination. 
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4. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement states: 
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's 
own advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, 
any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of 
Broker. 
5. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states: 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and 
use Agent's best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed 
with broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and 
otherwise promote the business of serving the public in real estate 
transactions to the end that each of the parties to this Agreement may 
derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit 
particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do 
so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with 
Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representa-
tion agreements or management contract of property, for the parties1 
mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
6. After January 1, 1994, Mitchell became a member and manager of Red 
Point Equity, L L C . ("Red Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business 
of real estate development. 
7. Mitchell became a member of Red Point which was organized to pursue 
real estate development activities. The other member and manager of Red Point was 
Mitchell's spouse. 
8. In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement with Leonard 
K.M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned unit development on property 
located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray, Utah. 
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9. In furtherance of the joint venture agreement and with the assistance of 
Mitchell acting as a real estate agent of Prime Commercial, Fong acquired the real 
property located on Atwood Boulevard from unrelated third parties resulting in the 
payment of real estate commissions to Prime Commercial. 
10. As a member in the joint venture, Red Point was to participate in a share 
of the profits. 
11. Fong and Mitchell also agreed that once the planned unit development 
was completed, Mitchell, as an agent of Prime Commercial, would market and sell the 
individual units pursuant to a listing agreement the joint venture would enter into with 
Prime Commercial. 
12. Fong subsequently refused to finance construction of the planned unit 
development, thereby breaching the joint venture agreement between Fong and Red 
Point. 
13. As a consequence of Fong's breach, Red Point commenced an action in 
the Third Judicial District Court entitled Red Point Equities, LC. v. Leonard K.M. Fona. 
Civil No. 9509093430CN. With the filing of the Complaint against Fong, Red Point 
recorded a lis pendens in the offices of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
14. To settle the claims in the Fong litigation, Fong purchased Red Point's 
interest in the joint venture for $15,000.00. The settlement amount paid was solely 
attributable to Red Point's interest in the joint venture. Neither Mitchell nor Prime 
Commercial had a listing agreement to sell any interest Red Point had in the joint 
Page 4 
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venture with Fong. Consequently, no portion of the settlement was for any 
commissions on the sale of finished or unfinished units. 
15. At the time that Fong purchased Red Point's interest in the joint venture, 
the joint venture had not entered into any listing agreement with Prime Commercial for 
the listing or sale of any of the finished units because no development or construction 
had commended. 
16. Mitchell's agency relationship with Prime Commercial on was terminated 
on or about August 31,1994. 
17. When Mitchell was not paid commissions in accordance with the terms 
of the Agreement for closings which were pending at the date of his termination and 
thereafter closed, Mitchell commenced this suit. In response to such claims, Prime 
Commercial counterclaimed asserting that Mitchell was obligated to pay commissions 
for new transactions subsequently entered into by Mitchell, including but not limited 
to alleged transactions for five properties previously listed by Mitchell while at Prime. 
18. On or about the 30th of May, 1995, Prime Commercial notified Mitchell 
through counsel of the amount of commissions due Mitchell for closed transactions 
(the "Closed Transactions") together with the five specific properties listed with Prime 
Commercial and procured by Mitchell prior to his leaving Prime Commercial for which 
potential commissions were claimed by Prime Commercial. The five properties 
previously listed by Mitchell for Prime Commercial were as follows: (i) 6-Plex - 479 
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East 5600 South; (ii) 2.5 acres at Alta; (iii) Alta Pines - 4070 South 900 East; (iv) 
Landing Point - 176 North Redwood Rd; and (v) 2.2 acres - W. Jordan. 
19. Of the above five designated properties, only three of them were under 
a current listing with Prime Commercial at the time Mitchell left. The 6-Plex property 
had been previously sold for which Prime Commercial received a commission, and 
there were no current listings with Prime Commercial for that property at the time 
Mitchell terminated his association with Prime Commercial. Also, Mitchell never had 
a listing agreement with Prime Commercial or any other brokerage for the acreage in 
West Jordan. 
20. Other than the listings for the Closed Transactions for which Mitchell 
claims commissions from Prime Commercial, and except for the three listings which 
did not result in closings, Mitchell had no other listings at the time he left Prime 
Commercial. 
2 1 . Mitchell received no commission from any of the three listings he had at 
the time he left Prime Commercial, each Prime Commercial listing having expired prior 
to the procurement of a buyer. 
22. Of the three properties for which Mitchell had listing agreements with 
Prime Commercial at the time Mitchell left Prime Commercial, Mitchell has not listed 
any of those properties with any other broker, nor has Mitchell collected commissions 
from any sale of such properties. 
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23. In its counterclaim and/or its affidavits in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, Prime Commercial makes claim for commissions on all 
Mitchell transactions for a period after termination of his agency relationship with 
Prime Commercial based upon the terms of the Agreement, or based upon a separate 
oral understanding. 
24. No evidence of a written modification to the Agreement was offered by 
either party. 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court finds as a matter of law 
as follows: 
1. The Agreement between Mitchell and Prime Commercial is an integrated 
contract as more particularly set forth in Paragraph 19(b) of the Agreement. 
2. The Agreement defines the relationship and duties between the parties, 
specifically limiting Mitchell's duties to soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, 
leases, representation agreements or management contracts of property for the 
parties' mutual benefit. Such duties do not include development activities and do not 
preclude Mitchell from pursuing such activities outside of the scope of the Agreement. 
3. The Agreement further provides that it may not be amended except in 
writing signed by the parties. 
4. Because the Agreement has no facial ambiguity and does not cover 
development activities, and because there was no amendment to the Agreement 
providing otherwise, Prime Commercial is not entitled to participate in any 
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consideration paid to Red Point (even if construed to be for the benefit of Mitchell) for 
profits or an interest in a development joint venture with Fong. 
5. Because the Agreement, specifically Paragraph 18, contains no facial 
ambiguity, and because the use of any information or materials gained by Mitchell from 
Prime Commercial would prohibit any competition by Mitchell, such restriction is 
unenforceable as a matter of law. 
6. Because Paragraph 18 is not ambiguous and because the contract is an 
integrated contract, the Defendant is not entitled to rely upon parol evidence, including 
but not limited to alleged industry standards of additional terms imposed upon agents 
after their termination with a brokers. 
7. There is no reference in Paragraph 18 to either a restriction in time or 
geographic area for the use of such information and Paragraph 18 is, therefore, 
unenforceable. 
8. As a consequence, the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
is hereby granted dismissing the counterclaims of the Defendant Prime Commercial 
against the Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell. 
ORDER DATED this ^ day of vTVumJ^ 1998. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Case No. 950906465 CV was mailed, postage prepaid, 
United States Mail, the (ffi day of May, 1998, to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Douglas E. Grant, Esq. 
Randall E. Grant, Esq. 
GRANT & GRANT 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Ulab-84111 
•jtWK* 
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THIS AGREEMENT, made this 1st day of January, 1994 by and between PRIME COMMERCIAL, 
INC ("Broker"), and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agent") an individual authorized to act as a licensed 
real estate agent in the State of Utah. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Broker is qualified to and does engage in business as a licensed general real 
estate broker in the State of Utah; and 
//HEREAS, Group maintains an office in the State of Utah, properly equipped with 
nirnishings and other equipment necessary and incidental to the proper operation of said 
business, and staffed suitably to serve the public as a real estate broker; and 
VHEREAS, Agent is now engaged in business as a licensed real estate agent; and 
WHEREAS, the parties consider it to be to their mutual advantage to form the association 
ereinafter agreed to, 
'OW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein 
Dntained, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
Broker agrees to make available to Agent, at Agent's request, all current listings in 
the Broker's office. In addition, at Agent's discretion and at Agent's request, Broker 
may, from time to time, supply Agent with prospective listings- Nothing herein stated 
shall be construed to require Agent to accept or service any particular listing or 
prospective listing offered by Broker; nor shall Broker have any right or authority 
to direct that Agent see or service particular parties, or to restrict Agent's activities 
to particular areas. Broker shall have no right, except to the extent required by law, 
to direct or limit Agent's activities as to hours, leads, open houses, opportunity or 
floor time, prospects, sales, sales meetings, schedule, services, inventory, time off, 
training, vacations, or similar activities. 
At Agent's request and in Agent's sole discretion, Broker agrees to furnish such 
advice, information and full cooperation as Agent shall decide. Broker agrees that by 
furnishing any such advice, information or cooperation, Broker obtains no authority 
or right to direct or control Agent's actions except as specifically required by law and 
that Agent assumes and retains discretion for methods, techniques and procedures 
used in soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, or representation 
agreements. 
Broker agrees that Agent may share with other agents all the facilities of the office 
now operated by Broker in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, 
which office is now maintained at 4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 120, Salt Lake City,' 
Utah 84124. 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and use Agent's 
best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, to solicit 
additional listings and customers for Broker and otherwise promote the business of 
serving the public in real estate transactions to the end that each of the parties to 
this Agreement may derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit particular listings 
or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do so. Agent agrees to perform no 
other activities in association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and 
sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, for the 
parties1 mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
Agent agrees to commit no act of a type for which the Securities Commission or the 
Board of Real Estate Examiners of the State of Utah is authorized to suspend or revoke 
the license of either Agent or Broker. Broker and Agent agree to conform to and 
abide by all laws, rules and regulations, and codes of ethics that are binding upon or 
applicable to real estate brokers or agents. 
Broker's typical and customary commissions from time to time in effect, shall be 
charged to the parties for whom services are performed, except that Broker may-
agree in writing to other rates with such parties. Broker will advise all agents 
associated with Broker of any special commission rates made with respect to the 
listings as provided in this* paragraph. When Agent shall perform any services under 
this Agreement for which a commission is earned, the commission shall, when 
collected, be divided between Broker and Agent as set forth in the Commission 
Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, unless 
Broker and Agent agree in writing upon a different method of dividing the 
commission before completion of any particular transaction. In the event that two-or 
more agents participate in any service which is subject to this Agreement, or claim 
to have done so, the amount of the commission over that accruing to Broker shall be 
divided between the participating agents according to agreement between them or 
by arbitration. In no case shall Broker be personally liable to Agent for Agent's 
share of any commission not collected, nor shall Agent be personally liable to Broker 
for any commissions not collected. In compliance with the laws of the- State of Utah, 
all commissions will be received by Broker. When any commission shall have been 
collected from the party or parties for whom the service was performed, Broker shall 
hold the same in trust for Agent and Broker to be divided between them according to 
the terms of this Agreement. Agents shall not have the right to negotiate 
commissions with current or prospective clients without first discussing same with 
Broker and obtaining permission from Broker. 
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after collection of such 
commissions from the party or parties for whom the services may have been 
performed. Any suit for the collection of commissions from clients shall be 
maintained only in the name of Broker. Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or 
payment from Broker upon future commissions or commissions earned but 
uncollected. Agent's only remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions 
paid by the party or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to 
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note. 
Broker shall not be liable to Agent for any expenses incurred by Agent, or for any of 
Agent's acts except as specifically required by law, nor shall Agent be liable to 
Broker for office help or expense/Agent shall have no authority to bind Broker by 
any promise or representation unless specifically authorized in writing in a 
particular transaction. Expenses that must, by reason of some necessity, be paid from 
the commission, or are incurred in the collection of, or the attempt to collect, the 
commission, shall be paid by the parties in the same proportion as the commission, 
divided pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
Agent agrees to provide and pay for all Agent's necessary professional licenses and 
dues; Broker shall not be liable to reimburse Agent therefor. In the event that Broker 
elects to advance sums to Agent for the payment of Agent's professional licenses, 
dues or other items, Agent agrees to repay such advances to Broker upon demand and 
Broker may deduct such advances from commissions otherwise payable to Agent. 
This Agreement does not constitute a hiring by either party. It is the parties' 
intention that, so far as shall be in conformity with law, Agent shall be an 
independent contractor and not Broker's employee, and in conformity therewith, 
that Agent retain sole and absolute discretion and judgment in the manner and 
means of carrying out Agent's selling and soliciting activities. Therefore, the parties 
hereto are and shall remain independent contractors bound by the provisions of this 
Agreement. Agent is under the control of Broker as to the result of Agent's work only 
and not as to the means by which such is accomplished. This Agreement shall not be 
construed as a partnership and Broker shall not be liable for any obligation incurred 
by Agent. 
In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property, and all 
employment in connection with the real estate business shall be taken in the name 
of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker within twenty four (24) hours after 
receipt of any such listing by Agent. In consideration for the commission payable to 
Agent pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby 
contribute all right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to 
"Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents associated with 
Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, however, that Agent shall 
have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of this Agreement with respect to listings 
procured by Agent prior to termination. 
On completion of any work-in-process, this Agreement may be terminated, with or 
without cause, by Broker or Agent at any time. Broker may terminate this 
Agreement on the occurrence of any. of the following causes: 
(a) An election of Broker to sell its entire business or to cease doing business; 
(b) Any breach of this Agreement by Agent; 
(c) Suspension, revocation, or other termination of Agent's license; 
(d) Failure of Agent to comply with any applicable law or regulation of 
either the Securities Commission or the Board of Real Estate Examiners; 
(e) Conviction of Agent of any crime other than minor traffic offenses. 
Upon termination of this Agreement, Agent's regular proportionate share of the 
commissions on any sales Agent has made that are not closed shall, upon the closing 
of such sales, be paid to Agent, if collected by Broker. Except in cases of termination 
for cause, Agent shall also be entitled to receive the portion of the commissions, 
received by Broker after termination, allocable to the listing (but not the sale) as set 
forth in Broker's current commissions schedules, on any listings procured by Agent 
during Agent's association with Broker. 
14. If, upon termination of this Agreement, Agent fails to complete work on any pending 
transactions that normally would be rendered by Agent, Broker shall make 
arrangements with another agent in Broker's organization to perform such work 
and- shall be compensated for completing the details of pending transactions and 
such compensation shall be deducted from Agent's share of the commission. 
15. In the event of disagreement or dispute between Agent and any other agent 
associated with Broker, or between Broker and Agent arising out of or connected 
with this Agreement which cannot be adjusted by and between the parties involved, 
the dispute or disagreement shall be submitted to the Real Estate Board of which 
Broker is a member for arbitration pursuant to the provisions of its bylaws, said 
provisions being hereby incorporated by reference, and if the bylaws of such board 
include no provision for arbitration, then arbitration shall be pursuant to the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association which rules are by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
16. Agent agrees to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless from, as well as defend 
Broker against, all claims, demands and liabilities, including costs and attorney's fees, 
to which Broker is subjected by reason of any action taken by Agent or failed to be 
taken by Agent pursuant; to this Agreement. 
17. It is contemplated by both parties to this Agreement that Agent will use a motor 
vehicle for the purpose of transporting clients or other persons as part of Agent's 
efforts to solicit and obtain listings and sales, rentals or leases of property, Agent 
agrees as part of Agent's commitment to serving the public as a licensed real estate 
agent to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance with the following minimum 
coverage's: $100,000/S300,000/S5,000 bodily injury/property damage (or a combined 
single limit of S3 00,000). Broker shall be named as an additional insured under 
Agent's insurance coverages. Agent shall provide proof that such coverages are in 
force at the time of execution of this Agreement and shall provide such proof at any 
subsequent time at Broker's request. 
18. Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, .any information 
or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker. 
19. The following provisions are also integral parts of this Agreement: 
(a) This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
successors, assigns, personal representatives, heirs and legatees of the 
respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the 
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto. 
(b) This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement 
between the parties and supersedes all prior agreements, representations 
or understandings between the parties relating to the subject matter 
hereof. All prior agreements relating to the subject matter hereof, 
whether written or oral, are hereby merged into this Agreement. 
(d) The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should any provision 
hereof be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, voidable or 
unenforceable provision shall not affect any other portion or provision 
of this Agreement. 
(e) Any waiver by either party hereto of any breach of any kind or 
character whatsoever by the other party, whether such waiver be direct 
or implied, shall not be construed as a continuing waiver of or consent to 
any subsequent breach of this Agreement on the part of the other party. 
(f) This Agreement may not be modified except by an instrument in writing 
signed by the parties hereto. 
(g) This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and enforced according to 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
(h) In the event any action or proceeding is brought by either party against 
the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover attorneys' fees in such amount as the court may adjudge 
reasonable. 
20. Agent stipulates that Agent has had the opportunity to review with Broker the 
policies and procedures of Broker and "Understands the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the date first set 
Forth above. 
:KNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
tiereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing Agreement together with Exhibit A 
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COMMISSION SCHEDULE 
Conditions Governing Payment of Commissions to Agent: 
L Broker will only pay commissions on cash income. 
2. If Broker's share of a commission or any part thereof is deferred or if a note is taken, 
Broker will not be required to pay any commission to Agent until cash income is 
received. 
3. If a note is taken by Broker for commissions owed and interest is earned on that note, 
then Agent shall receive a share of the interest proceeds in the same proportions as 
the commission splits set forth in Exhibit A. 
4 The commission schedule shall be based on Exhibit A as attached hereto. Said 
schedule shall remain in effect, unless agreed upon by both parties* in writing. 
PARTNER ASSOCIATE 
50-50 
60-40 
70-30 
TOTAL 
$0.00 
$55,000.00 
$90,000.00 
$55,000.00 
$90,000.00 
$250,000.00 
$27,500.00 
$21,000.00 
$112,000.00 
$160,500.00 
$27,500.00 
$14,000.00 
$48,000.00 
$89,500.00 64.20% 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Fax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, A Corpor-
ation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF BRENT D. MITCHELL, by and through his attorneys, 
complains of Defendants and for causes of action alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell") is an individual 
residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime") is a Utah 
corporation whose principal place of business is located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Salt Lake Board of Realtors is a Utah corpora-
tion whose principal offices are located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
COMPLAINT 
CIVIL NO 
JUDGE .K'-w?- «>•%•• ,. 
^^uni^tM. STIR3A 
MITCHELL.CMP (AN) 
M0053-06427 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract - Prime) 
4. On or about the 1st of January, 1994, Plaintiff entered 
into an agency Agreement with Defendant Prime whereby Plaintiff 
agreed to act as an agent for Prime and Defendant Prime agreed to 
pay commissions to Plaintiff for property listed and/or sold by 
Plaintiff on behalf of Defendant Prime. A copy of the Agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
5. Plaintiff terminated his relationship as an agent with 
Prime on or about the 31st of August, 1994. 
6. Pursuant to Paragraph 13 of the Agreement and as a result 
of Plaintiff's efforts, Prime owes Plaintiff outstanding commis-
sions in a sum not less than $20,544.69. 
7. Despite Plaintiff's numerous requests, Defendant Prime 
has failed and refused to pay the commissions due and owing to 
Plaintiff. 
8. Interest upon the unpaid commissions is accruing at the 
legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as more particularly set 
forth below. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Relief - Board) 
9. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 8 as if fully set forth hereat. 
10. Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Agreement, Plaintiff and 
Prime were obligated to submit the subject dispute regarding 
MITCHELL. CMP (AN) 
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commissions owing to Plaintiff to the Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
("Board") for arbitration (Exhibit "A"). 
11. On or about the 5th of January, 1995, Plaintiff submitted 
its Demand for Arbitration to the American Arbitration Association. 
12. A hearing was originally scheduled by the Board for April 
5, 1995. This hearing was continued by the Board until April 24, 
1995. 
13. Shortly thereafter, the April 24, 1995 hearing was 
indefinitely continued by the Board. 
14. The Board has failed and refused to reschedule a hearing 
regarding the subject dispute between Plaintiff and Prime despite 
Plaintiff's numerous requests that an arbitration hearing be 
scheduled. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as more fully set forth 
below. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Attorney's Fees and Costs) 
15. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs 1 through 14 as if fully set forth hereat. 
16. Paragraph 19(h) of the Agreement states: "In the event 
any action or proceeding is brought by either party against the 
other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled 
to recover attorneys' fees in such amount as the court may adjudge 
reasonable" (Exhibit "A"). 
MITCHELL. CMP (AN) 
17. Pursuant to Paragraph 19(h) of the Agreement, Plaintiff 
is entitled to his reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
bringing this action and in pursuing the arbitration claims. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
1. On Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief, for damages in the 
amount of $20,544.69 plus interest at the legal rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum; 
2. On Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief, for declaratory 
judgment declaring that the subject dispute need not be arbitrated 
for reason of the Board's failure to timely schedule a hearing on 
this matter or in the alternative a mandatory injunction requiring 
the Board to schedule a hearing between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
3. On Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief, for Plaintiff's 
costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred in this matter; 
4. For such other relief this Court deems just and equita-
ble. 
DATED this / 3 day of S^rten^er, 1995. 
~<fo*+* 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
ANDREA NUFFER 
DENNIS K, POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
4085 South 1242 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
MITCHELL.CMP (AN) 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this 1st day of January, 1994 by and between PRIME COMMERCIAL, 
INC ("Broker"), and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agent") an individual authorized to act as a licensed 
real estate agent in the State of Utah. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Broker is qualified to and does engage in business as a Kcensed general real 
estate broker in the State of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Group maintains an office in the State of Utah, properly equipped with 
furnishings and other equipment necessary and incidental to the proper operation of said 
business, and staffed suitably to serve the public as a real estate broker; and 
WHEREAS, Agent is now engaged in business as a licensed real estate agent; and 
WHEREAS, the parties consider it to be to their mutual advantage to form the association 
hereinafter agreed to, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein 
contained, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
L Broker agrees to make available to Agent, at Agent's request, all current listings in 
the Broker's office. In addition, at Agent's discretion and at Agent's request, Broker 
ma}', from time to time, supply Agent with prospective listings. Nothing herein stated 
shall be construed to require Agent to accept or service any particular listing or 
prospective listing offered by Broker, nor shall Broker have any right or authority 
to direct that Agent see or service particular parties, or to restrict Agent's activities 
to particular areas- Broker shall have no right, except to the extent required by law, 
to direct or limit Agent's activities as to hours, leads, open houses, opportunity or 
floor time, prospects, sales, sales meetings, schedule, services, inventory, time off, 
training, vacations, or similar activities. 
2. At Agent's request and in Agent's sole discretion, Broker agrees to furnish such 
advice, information and full cooperation as Agent shall decide. Broker agrees that by 
furnishing any such advice, information or cooperation, Broker obtains no authority 
or right to direct or control Agent's actions except as specifically required by law and 
that Agent assumes and retains discretion for methods, techniques and procedures 
used in soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, or representation 
agreements. 
Broker agrees that Agent may share with other agents all the facilities of the office 
now operated by Broker in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, 
which office is now maintained at 4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 120, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84124. 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and use Agent's 
best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, to solicit 
additional listings and customers for Broker and otherwise promote the business of 
serving the public in real estate transactions to the end that each of the parties to 
this Agreement may derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit particular listings 
or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do so. Agent agrees to perform no 
other activities in association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and 
sales,, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, for the 
parties1 mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
Agent agrees to commit no act of a type for which the Securities Commission or the 
Board of Real Estate Examiners of the State of Utah is authorized to suspend or revoke 
the license of either Agent or Broker. Broker and Agent agree to conform to and 
abide by all laws, rules and regulations, and codes of ethics that are binding upon or 
applicable to real estate brokers or agents. 
Broker's typical and customary commissions from time to time in effect, shall be 
charged to the parties for whom services are performed, except that Broker may-
agree in writing to other rates with such parties. Broker will advise all agents 
associated with Broker of any special commission rates made with respect to the 
listings as provided in this- paragraph. When Agent shall perform any services under 
this Agreement for which a commission is earned, the commission shall, when 
collected, be divided between Broker and Agent as set forth in the Commission 
Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, unless 
Broker and Agent agree in writing upon a different method of dividing the 
commission before completion of any particular transaction. In the event that two-or 
more agents participate in any service which is subject to this Agreement, or claim 
to have done so, the amount of the commission over that accruing to Broker shall be 
divided between the participating agents according to agreement between them or 
by arbitration. In no case shall Broker be personally liable to Agent for Agent's 
share of any commission not collected, nor shall Agent be personally liable to Broker 
for any commissions not collected. In compliance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
all commissions will be received by Broker. When any commission shall have been 
collected from the party or parties for whom the service was performed, Broker shall 
hold the same in trust for Agent and Broker to be divided between them according to 
the terms of this Agreement. Agents shall not have the right to negotiate 
commissions with current or prospective clients without first discussing same with 
Broker and obtaining permission from Broker. 
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after collection of such 
commissions from the party or parties for whom the services may have been 
performed. Any suit for the collection of commissions from clients shall be 
maintained only in the name of Broker. Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or 
payment from Broker upon future commissions or commissions earned but 
uncollected. Agent's only remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions 
paid by the party or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to 
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note. 
Broker shall not be liable to Agent for any expenses incurred by Agent, or for any of 
Agent's acts except as specifically required by law, nor shall Agent be liable to 
Broker for office help or expense. Agent shall have no authority to bind Broker by 
any promise or representation unless specifically authorized in writing in a 
particular transaction. Expenses that must, by reason of some necessity, be paid from 
the commission, or are incurred in the collection of, or the attempt to collect, the 
commission, shall be paid by the parties in the same proportion as the commission, 
divided pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
Agent agrees to provide and pay for all Agent's necessary professional licenses and 
dues; Broker shall not be liable to reimburse Agent therefor. In the event that Broker 
elects to advance sums to Agent for the payment of Agent's professional licenses, 
dues or other items, Agent agrees to repay such advances to Broker upon demand and 
Broker may deduct such advances from commissions otherwise payable to Agent. 
This Agreement does not constitute a hiring by either party. It is the parties' 
intention that, so far as shall be in conformity with law, Agent shall be an 
independent contractor and not Broker's employee, and in conformity therewith, 
that Agent retain sole and absolute discretion and judgment in the manner and 
means of carrying out Agent's selling and soliciting activities. Therefore, the parties 
hereto are and shall remain independent contractors bound by the provisions of this 
Agreement. Agent is under the control of Broker as to the result of Agent's work only 
and not as to the means by which such is accomplished. This Agreement shall not be 
construed as a partnership and Broker shall not be liable for any obligation incurred 
by Agent. 
In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property, and all 
employment in connection with the real estate business shall be taken in the name 
of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker within twenty four (24) hours after 
receipt of any such listing by Agent. In consideration for the commission payable to 
Agent pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby 
contribute all right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to 
"Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents associated with 
Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, however, that Agent shall 
have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of this Agreement with respect to listings 
procured by Agent prior to termination. 
On completion of any work-in-process, this Agreement may be terminated, with or 
without cause, by Broker or Agent at any time. Broker may ..terminate this 
Agreement on the occurrence of any of the following causes: 
(a) An election of Broker to sell its entire business or to cease doing business; 
(b) Any breach of this Agreement by Agent; 
(c) Suspension, revocation, or other termination of Agent's license; 
(d) Failure of Agent to comply with any applicable law or regulation of 
either the Securities Commission or the Board of Real Estate Examiners; 
(e) Conviction of Agent of any crime other than minor traffic offenses. 
Upon termination of this Agreement, Agent's regular proportionate share of the 
commissions on any sales Agent has made that are not closed shall, upon the closing 
of such sales, be paid to Agent, if collected by Broker. Except in cases of termination 
for cause, Agent shall also be entitled to receive the portion of the commissions, 
received by Broker after termination, allocable to the listing (but not the sale) as set 
forth in Broker's current commissions schedules, on any listings procured by Agent 
during Agent's association with Broker. 
14. If, upon termination of this Agreement, Agent fails to complete work on any pending 
transactions that normally would be rendered by Agent, Broker shall make 
arrangements with another agent in Broker's organization to perform such work 
and- shall be compensated for completing the details of pending transactions and 
such compensation shall be deducted from Agent's share of the commission. 
15. In the event of disagreement or dispute between Agent and any other agent 
associated with Broker, or between Broker and Agent arising out of or connected 
with this Agreement which cannot be adjusted by and between the parties involved, 
the dispute or disagreement shall be submitted to the Real Estate Board of which 
Broker is a member for arbitration pursuant to the provisions of its bylaws, said 
provisions being hereby incorporated by reference, and if the bylaws of such board 
include no provision for arbitration, then arbitration shall be pursuant to the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association which rules are by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
16. Agent agrees to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless from, as well as defend 
Broker against, all claims, demands and liabilities, including costs and attorney's fees, 
to which Broker is subjected by reason of any action taken by Agent or failed to be 
taken by Agent pursuant to this Agreement. 
17. It is contemplated by both parties to this Agreement that Agent will use a motor 
vehicle for the purpose of transporting clients or other persons as part of Agent's 
efforts to solicit and obtain listings and sales, rentals or leases of property, Agent 
agrees as part of Agent's commitment to serving the public as a licensed real estate 
agent to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance with the following minimum 
coverage's: $100,000/S300,000/$5,000 bodily injury/property damage (or a combined 
single limit of S300,000). Broker shall be named as an additional insured under 
Agent's insurance coverages. Agent shall provide proof that such coverages are in 
force at the time of execution of this Agreement and shall provide such proof at any 
subsequent time at Broker's request. 
18. Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, .any information 
or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker. 
19. The following provisions are also integral parts of this Agreement: 
(a) This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
successors, assigns, personal representatives, heirs and legatees of the 
respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the 
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto. 
(b) This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement 
between the parties and supersedes all prior agreements, representations 
or understandings between the parties relating to the subject matter 
hereof. All prior agreements relating to the subject matter hereof, 
whether written or oral, are hereby merged into this Agreement. 
(d) The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should any provision 
hereof be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, voidable or 
unenforceable provision shall not affect any other portion or provision 
of this Agreement. 
(e) Any waiver by either party hereto of any breach of any kind or 
character whatsoever by the other party, whether such waiver be direct 
or implied, shall not be construed as a continuing waiver of or consent to 
any subsequent breach of this Agreement on the part of the other party. 
(f) This Agreement may not be modified except by an instrument in writing 
signed by the parties hereto. 
(g) This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and enforced according to 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
(h) In the event any action or proceeding is brought by either party against 
the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover attorneys' fees in such amount as the court may adjudge 
reasonable. 
20. Agent stipulates that Agent has had the opportunity to review with Broker the 
policies and procedures of Broker and "Understands the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the date first set 
forth above. 
AGENT ^ 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing Agreement together with Exhibit A 
thereto. 
COMMISSION SCHEDUDE 
Conditions Governing Payment of Commissions to Agent: 
L Broker will only pay commissions on cash income. 
2L If Broker's share of a commission or any part thereof is deferred or .if a note is taken, 
Broker will not be required to pay any commission to Agent until cash income is 
received. 
3. If a note is taken by Broker for commissions owed and interest is earned on that note, 
then Agent shall receive a share of the interest proceeds in the same proportions as 
the commission splits set forth in Exhibit A. 
4 The commission schedule shall be based on Exhibit A as attached hereto- Said 
schedule shall remain in effect, unless agreed upon by both parties- .in writing. 
PARTNER ASSOCIATE 
50-50 
60-40 
70-30 
TOTAL 
$0.00 
$55,000.00 
$90,000.00 
$55,000.00 
$90,000.00 
$250,000.00 
$27,500.00 
$21,000.00 
$112,000.00 
$160,500.00 
$27,500.00 
$14,000.00 
$48,000.00 
$89,500.00 64.20% 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, a 
Corporation, 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF DEFENDANT PRIME COMMERCIAL, 
INC. 
Civil No. 950906465CV 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA Defendants. 
ooOoo 
Defendant, PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., answers plaintiff's 
Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Responding to the specific paragraphs of plaintiff's 
Complaint the defendant answers as follows: 
1. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1. 
2. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 2. 
3. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3. 
2 
4. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4. 
5. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 5. 
6. Denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 6. 
7. Denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 7. 
8* Denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 8. 
9. In response to paragraph 9, Prime Commercial, Inc. 
realleges and incorporates by reference its answer to paragraph 1 
through 8. 
10. Admits that Prime Commercial, Inc. and Plaintiff agreed 
to arbitration pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Agreement but 
denies each and every other allegation contained in Paragraph 10. 
11. Prime Commercial, Inc. denies the allegations contained 
in paragraph 11 of plaintiff's Complaint for lack of information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
same. 
12. Based on information and belief, Prime Commercial, Inc. 
admits the allegations contained in paragraph 12. 
13. Prime Commercial, Inc. denies the allegations contained 
in paragraph 13 of plaintiff's Complaint for lack of information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
same. 
14. Prime Commercial, Inc. denies the allegations contained 
in paragraph 14 of plaintiff's Complaint for lack of information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
same. 
15. In response to paragraph 15, Prime Commercial, Inc. 
3 
realleges and incorporates by reference its answer to paragraph 1 
through 14. 
16. Admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 16. 
17. Denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 17. 
THIRD DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff's 
claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver 
and laches. 
FOURTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff 
failed to perform all of plaintiff's obligations under the 
contract. 
FIFTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff has 
failed to mitigate its damages. 
SIXTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the plaintiff has 
failed to perform certain conditions precedent and that 
plaintiff's claims are barred. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the claims of the 
plaintiff are barred by the negligence of the plaintiff. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
The defendant affirmatively alleges that the claims of the 
plaintiff and barred by the fraud and misrepresentative of the 
plaintiff. 
4 
NINTH DEFENSE (Affirmative) 
For a separate and partial defense to plaintiff's complaint, 
defendant affirmatively alleges that plaintiff owes Prime 
Commercial, Inc. for commissions he received after leaving Prime 
Commercial for which Prime Commercial, Inc. is entitled to and 
that defendant is entitled to full credit and offset against any 
amount allegedly owed to or claimed by plaintiff. This is more 
fully set forth in the Counterclaim which follows. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that plaintiff's complaint be 
dismissed, with prejudice, that plaintiff take nothing thereby, 
and that the defendant be awarded his costs, attorney's fees and 
such other further relief as the Court deems appropriate, 
including the relief sought by the defendant in its Counterclaim 
which follows: 
C O U N T E R C L A I M 
Defendant, PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., hereby counterclaims 
against the plaintiff, BRENT D. MITCHELL, and alleges as follows: 
1. That plaintiff, BRENT D. MITCHELL "Mitchell"r is an 
individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That counterclaimant, PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., is a Utah 
Corporation with its principal place of business in Salt lake 
County, Utah. 
3. The events and transactions described in this 
counterclaim took place and were to be performed in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
5 
4. On or about the 1st of January, 1994, Mitchell entered 
into an Agreement with Prime Commercial, Inc. A copy of the 
Agreement is attached to Plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit "A". 
5. As per paragraphs 7, 11 and 18 of the agreement, 
Mitchell was contractually bound to use Prime Commercial, Inc.'s 
resources for Prime Commercial Inc.'s benefit. 
6. Upon information and belief, Mitchell has received 
commission payments (in the form of a partnership buy-out) in the 
amount of $15,000.00 of which Prime Commercial, Inc. is entitled 
to its commission split of $7,500.00. 
7. Upon information and belief, after Mitchell's 
termination he received other commission payments which were 
obtained because of information and/or materials gained from the 
files or business of Prime Commercial Inc. The amount of damages 
are as yet not determined and should be determined by the Court 
at trial based upon the evidence. 
8. The counterclaimant has had to hire an attorney to 
prosecute this action and should be awarded reasonable attorney's 
fees, and costs of suit and interest at the lawful rate. 
WHEREFORE, the counterclaimant prays for judgment against 
the plaintiff as follows: 
1. For judgment against Mitchell in an amount to be 
determined by the Court at trial based upon the evidence. 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate. 
6 
DATED this 72^ day of October, 1995. 
GRANT & GRANT 
iglas/E. Gi^ smt 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Counterclaimant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim, this day of 
October, 1995, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis K. Poole 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Ford G. Scalley 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, A Corpor-
ation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRENT D. MITCHELL 
CIVIL NO. 950906465 CV 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Apart from my employment as a real estate agent, I am 
also a member and manager of Red Point Equity, L.L.C. ("Red 
Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business of 
real estate development. 
2. I became a member of Red Point which was organized to 
pursue real estate development activities independent of any Agent-
Broker relationship existing between me and Prime Commercial. 
MITCH2.AFP (AN) 
3. In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Leonard K. M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned 
unit development on property located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray, 
Utah. 
4. With my assistance, and in furtherance of the joint 
venture agreement, Fong acquired the real property located on 
Atwood Boulevard from unrelated third parties resulting in the 
payment of real estate commissions to Prime Commercial. 
5. As the developer of the project on Atwood and pursuant to 
the terms of the joint venture agreement between Red Point and 
Fong, Red Point was to retain a share of the profits from the 
venture. The profits Red Point was to retain were for Red Point's 
development activities, and not any activities associated with 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement between me and Prime Commercial. 
6. Fong and I agreed that once the planned unit development 
was completed I, as an agent of Prime Commercial, would market and 
sell the individual units pursuant to a listing agreement the joint 
venture would enter into with Prime Commercial. 
7. Fong subsequently refused to finance construction of the 
planned unit development, thereby breaching the joint venture 
agreement between Fong and Red Point. 
8. As a consequence of Fong's breach, Red Point commenced an 
action in Third District Court entitled Red Point Equities, L.C. v. 
Leonard K.M. Fong, Civil No. 950903430CN. With the filing of the 
Complaint against Fong, Red Point recorded a lis pendens in the 
offices of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
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9. In an attempt to resolve the breach of the joint venture 
agreement and to settle the claims in the above-mentioned litiga-
tion, Fong purchased Red Point's interest in the joint venture for 
approximately $15,000.00. The settlement amount paid was solely 
attributable to Red Point's interest in the joint venture. Neither 
Prime Commercial nor I had a listing agreement to sell any joint 
venture/partnership interest Red Point had in the joint venture 
with Fong. Consequently, no portion of the settlement was for any 
commissions on the sale of the finished or unfinished units. 
10. At the time that Fong purchased Red Point's interest in 
the joint venture agreement, the joint venture had not entered into 
any listing agreements with Prime Commercial for the listing or 
sale of any of the finished units because no development or 
construction had commenced. 
11. On or about the 30th of May, 1995, my attorney received 
a letter from counsel for Prime Commercial which listed five 
properties as known listings which I had procured for Prime 
Commercial prior to my leaving. A copy of this letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit nAfl. 
12. Of the above five properties listed on the May 30th 
letter from counsel for Prime Commercial, only three of them were 
listed with Prime Commercial at the time I left. The 6-Plex 
property had been previously sold for which Prime Commercial 
received a commission; and there was no current listing with Prime 
Commercial for that property at the time I terminated my associa-
tion. (Exhibit "A"). Also, I never had a listing agreement with 
MITCH2.AFF (AN) ^ 
either Prime Commercial or any other broker for the 1.8 acres in 
West Jordan. 
13. I had no other listings at the time I left Prime 
Commercial. 
14. I received no commissions from any of the three listings 
I had at the time I left Prime Commercial. Each of those listings 
expired before a buyer was located. 
15. Of the three properties for which I had listing agree-
ments with Prime Commercial at the time I left Prime Commercial, I 
have not listed any of those properties with any other broker, nor 
have I collected commissions from any sales of such properties. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this / V day of April, 1996. 
BRENT D. MITCHELL 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me by BRENT D. MITCHELL this / / day of 
MITCH2.AFF (AN) 4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT D. MITCHELL in Civil No. 950903430 CN was 
mailed, U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following: 
Douglas E. Grant, Esq. 
Randall E. Grant, Esq. 
GRANT & GRANT 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
this / / day of April, 1996. 
<^{/jf 
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May 25, 1995 
Dennis K. Poole, Esq. 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES 
4543 South 700 East. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Re* Prime Commercial, Inc. and Brent Mitchell 
Dear Mr. Pooie: 
Thank you for your letter of May 16, 1995 outlining the claims of Brent Mitchell against Prime 
Commercial, Inc. I met this morning with my client and reviewed each transaction listed in your lerter. 
My client's accounting of said transactions is as follows: 
Total Agreed Upon Gross 
Escrow Date Close Date Commission Reductions Commission 
Gordon - Furstenau 
Stewart - Farnsworth 
Stewart - Brenkenridgc 
Fong - Kessimakis 
Reynolds - Triple K 
3/4/94 
6/23/94 
8/29/94 
5/24/94 
5/25/94 
6/29/94 
8/16/94 
9/13/94 
11/16/94 
5/8/95 
$28,083.00 
$ 6,500.00 
$ 6,500.00 
$16,800.00 
$38,437.50 
$( 7,020.75) 
$( 847.50) 
$( 847.50) 
$( 5,600.00) 
$(15,375.00) 
$21,062.25 
$ 5,652.50 
$ 5,625.50 
$11,200.00 
$23,062.50 
My client has calculated the commission splits between Broker and Agent as follows: 
Close Date 
Gross 
Commission 
Coirnn. 
Split 
1994: 
Pre-Petition Commission?; 
Anderson - Boyce 2/16/94 
Reynolds - Black 3/14/94 
Jeafcins - Ptaxson 4H7/94 
$ 7,200.00 50/50 
$ 6,000.00 50/50 
$ 2,994.00 50/50 
Post-Petition Commissions. 
Gordon - Furstenau 
Stewart - Farnsworth 
Stewart - Brenkenridge 
Fong - Kessimakis 
6/29/94 
8/16/94 
9/13/94 
11/16794 
11/16/94 
$21,062.25 
$ 5,652.50 
$ 5,625.50 
$ 6.438.75 
$ 4,761.25 
50/50 
50/50 
50/50 
50/50 
60/40 
Net Comm. 
Due Mitch. 
$ 3,600.00 
$ 3,000.00 
$ 1,497.00 
$10,531.13 
$ 2,826.25 
$ 2,826.25 
$ 3.219.38 
$2,856.75 
Amount 
Paid 
Paid 
Pre-nctition 
$ 3,600.00 
$ 3,000.00 
$ 1,497.00 
Paid/Offset 
Post-petition 
$10,531.13.. 
$ 2,715.19" 
$ -0-
$ -0-
$ -0-
Dennis K. Poole, Esq, 
May 25, 1995 
Page -2-
Gross Coram. Net Comm. Amount 
Close Date Commission Split Due Mitch. Paid 
1995: 
Reynolds - Triple K 5/8/95 $23,062.50 50/50 511,531.25 $ -0-
TJie amount due Mitchell is summarized as follows: 
Pre-petition Commissions Earned $ 8,097.00 
Pre-petition credit to Mitchell $ 1,687.73 
Pre-petition Payments to Mitchell $ (8,800.00) 
Pre-petition advances to Mitchell S f6.224.72) 
Amount due Prime Commercial from Mitchell as of 4/27/94 S r5,239.99) 
Said amount is discharged through Bankruptcy filed on 4/28/94 S 5.239.99 
Post-petition Commissions Earned $ 33,791.01 
Post-petition Payments to Mitchell (Checks and offsets) See Exhibit Sfl3.246.32) 
Commissions Due Mitchell S 20.5*4.69 
There were several known listings your client had at the time he left Prime Commercial. We need 
to know if any of these listings closed with Mr. Mitcheirs subsequent broker to dctennine if Prime 
Commercial is entitled to remuneration. 
Those listed by Mr. Mitchell were as follows: 
1. 6-PIcx - 479 East 5600 South - $250,000 - 6% 
2. 2.5 acres at Alta - $250,000 - 10% 
3. Alta Pines - 4070 South 900 East - $2,650,000 - 5% 
4. Landing Point - 176 North Redwood Rd. $3,500,000 - 3.5% 
5. 2.2 acres - W. Jordan - $180,000 - 6% 
We also need to know if there were any other closings for listings entered into during the time 
your client was at Prime Commercial. 
Inasmuch as the earnest money on Gordon - Furstenau was paid on 3/4/94 (pre-petition) and 
closed on 6/29/94 (post-petition) we need to have verified that said amount was disclosed as an account 
receivable in the bankruptcy proceeding and was abandoned by the Trustee. We will either pay the 
commission due to your client, or the bankruptcy trustee* 
Dennis K. Poole. Esq, 
May 25, 1995 
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GRANT & GRANT, A*-C 
'Dougla^E. Grant 
DEG/rab 
End. 
cc Mr. Steve Urty 
MITCHEL 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
1*27/94 C0MM.JE1KINS/PEARS0N | 
BR.COMM. I S P U T I NETCOMM. I 
i2,994.00T 
R 28/94 BANKRUPTCY FILING/DEBT DISCHARQED 1 
[5'10/94 SKOOL LUNCHAPR94 I 
5/10/94 SLBRDUESAPR94 
6/10/94 HEALTH INS. 5/94 
5/10/94 UlRFARE PHOEhllX/AM. WEST | 
l&'IOAK 1i 
mo/a* i 
f & 23/94 
1 6/1/94 
TOTAL 
DATE 
6/1/94 
I 6/13/94 
6/13/94 
6/13/94 
6/13/94 
6/21/94 
6/24/94 
1 6/24/94 
1 6/28/94 
6/29/94 
1 600/94 
I 6/30/94 
7/BJ94 
7/B/94 
7/8/94 
7/8794 
7/12/94 
j 7/12/94 
I 7/26/94 
I 6/2/94 
J e/3/94 
| 6/8/94 
1 B/lB/W 
NEWSPAPER AD 4/17 J 
DEALS EXPENSE REIMBURSED 1 
3ELLULAI* BILL 5/14/94 I 
1EALTH INS. 6/94 f 
DESCRIPTION 
SKOOL LUNCH MAY94 
SLBRDUESMAY94 
CREDIT ON AMEX-TICKET 
STAN ADAMS BILL 
CHECK \SSVED 
$2,994.00 
J3R. COMNL 
CELLULAR BILL 6/11/94 | 
CHECK ISSUED (LAURI HARMER) 
CHECK ISSUED 
CELLULAR BILL 6/24/94 
COMM.FURSTENAU/GORDON 
PMT. TO STAN ADAMS 
E & 0IHS. DOWN PMT. 
NEWSPAPER AD 5/29/34 
EVES SIGNS 
1 
$21,062J25 
HEALTH INS. 7/94 
SKDOL LUNCH 6/94 
PROGRESSIVE INS. 
SLBR JUN94 
CELLULAR BILL 7/23/94 
HEALTH INS. AUG94 
E & 0 INS. PMT. 
SLBRJUL94 
|CCMM.LARRY STEWART DUPLE 
j 
1 
1 J5.652.6C 
1 B/16/94 IDEAL EXPENSES REIMBURSED I 
50/50 
1 
—T 
- — j . 
SPUT 
50/50 
) 50/5C 
$1,487.00 1 
$1,497.00 
NETCOMM. 
510,531.13 
1 •* 
I ' '" ) $2,826.2! 
CK.ISSD. 1 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
CK.ISSD. 
C2.000.00 
$4,000.00 
$2,000.00 
$0.00 
, . ! - . . . - J i 
) | $1,783.7? 
DEBIT 
$1,000:00 
$9.67 j 
$37.00 
CREDIT j 
$1,497.00 
$5,239.81 
$8150 | 
$248.00 
$47.60 
$37140 
$67.65 
$1,84422 
DEBIT 
$22.88 
$37.00 1 
$59.97 
52,000.00 
$368.42 
$4,000.00 
1 $2,000.00 
$131.96 
$500.00 
$154.71 
$45.90 
$292.19 
$67.05 
$14.95 
$112.02 
$37.00 
$160.72 
$67.05 
$61.09 
$37.0C 
i I $1,783.7£ 
J 1 
$131,751 
$6,868.56 
CREDIT 
$129.00 
$10,531.13 
k-I 
I I I . 
> $2,626.2* 
I $169.0! 
BALANCE 
($5,239.81) 
$0.00 
"" |$9.67) 
($46:67) 
($109.17) 
($357-17) 
($404.77) 
($273.02) 
($645.42) 
($712.47)| 
($71247) 
BALANCE 
($735.13) 
($77213) 
($643.13) 
($703.10) 
($2,703.10) 
($3,071.52) 
($7,071.62) 
($9,071.52) 
($9,203.48) 
$1,327.65 
$827.65 1 
$672.94 
$627.04 1 
$334.651 
$267.80 
$252.851 
$140,831 
$103.83 
($56.89)1 
($123.94) 
($18503) 
($222.03) 
i $620.47 
>\ $989.52] 
6/29/94 
8/31/94 
_8/8/94_ 
_9/B/94 
9/13/94 
J/18/94 
J/2B/94 
G/2B/94 
CELLULAR Bil l B/24/94 
PROGRESSIVE INS. 
HEALTH INS. 9/9T~ 
E & 0 IMS 
10/19/94 
10/19/94 
12/13/94 
u new 
1/19/94 
IKINKOS SEP94 
[SLBRSEP94 . [_ 
iSTAN ADAMS BILL RE: KEN LOV1SA 
COMM.FONG/KESSIMAK1S i v v r i m . i v^nu/rsCOOIIWAfvJS 
COMMJONO/KESSIMAKIS 
